Question No 1 And Answer

1) Who’s winning right now — and what’s coming in the war? After months of troop buildup along Ukraine’s borders, Russia raided Ukraine on February 24, 2022, from multiple fronts, bombarding metropolises across the country, with Kyiv, the capital, as the main target. Kyiv didn’t fall. Not in a matter of days, as prognosticated, and not a full time into the war. A creative and flexible Ukrainian resistance combined with confounding logistical and politic mistakes from the Russian military converted the silhouettes of the conflict. Russia directed its sweats on the east and the south, and the war came a grinding battle in the Donbas. In the late summer and fall, Ukraine launched successful counterassaults , regaining some 400 square long hauls of home. Ukrainians pushed into the areas near Kharkiv and reacquired the crucial megacity of Lyman, in the Donetsk region. In November, Ukraine forced a Russian retreat to the other side of the Dnipro River in Kherson. The frontal lines have remained largely the same since, with no decisive advantage for either Russia or Ukraine right now. Russia used its partial rallying to bring further people to the front, shoring up protective lines that made it harder for Ukraine to keep pushing forward. Ukraine has also dug in, preparing for a possible Russian attack. A mild, muddy downtime also made any major moves delicate. Russia has tried to take Bakhmut in Donetsk for months, and while colors are advancing — taking near municipalities, like Soledar it has been veritably slow and veritably expensive. It’s an attritional battle, with high casualties, especially for Russia, which has been counting on captivity rookies associated with the Wagner Group as cannon fodder in combat. Russia’s continued drive around Bakhmut now looks to be part of a larger Russian descent that started a many weeks agone
. Russia is attacking along multiple fronts, rather than launching one big drive. It’s making some incremental earnings, but with limited strategic value so far. And as this descent unfolds, hints of the Russian service’s dysfunction continue. The US estimates Russia has committed about 80 percent of its available forces to Ukraine, but Russia is floundering to make significant advances. In Vuhledar, in the southeast, Ukrainian officers estimate that Russia expended dozens of armored fighting vehicles and tanks, and suffered stunning casualties. UK Defense Secretary Benjamin Wallace said “ a whole Russian squad was effectively annihilated ” there. Still, the Ukrainian service has also used lots of security and horsepower in protecting off these advances. It’s burning through thousands of rounds of security daily, at a rate potentially briskly than it can be replaced by Western backers.

Ukraine is likely gearing up for its own counterattack in the spring, but it’ll need further munitions, along with the Western tanks and army fighting and armored vehicles that have been promised. NATO Secretary- General Jens Stoltenberg has described it as a “ race against logistics ” between Ukraine and Russia, and their separate backers. All of this makes it hard to see exactly how moreover Russia or Ukraine could dramatically shift the frontal lines in the coming weeks or months. The attritional nature of the war is straining coffers on both sides. Ukraine still has instigation from last fall, but Russia’s retreat allowed it to take up more defensible positions for illustration, on the other side of the Dnipro in Kherson. That will make it that much harder for Ukraine to break through this time around. There are also questions about how new, more advanced Western munitions might impact the battleground — and when promised support, like tanks, will get to the frontal lines, and what that will mean for Ukraine’s own likely counterattack.